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[AUTHOR: Al-Imam Jamal al-Din Muhammad Ibn Malik (d) | SHARIH: Al- Imam Baha al-Din 'Abd Allah Ibn 'Aqil (d) | HASHIYAH: Al-Allamah Muhammad. Sharh Alfiat ibn Maalik by Ibn 'Aqeel - Explanation of Alfiat ibn Malik by Imam ibn ' Aqeel, the essential explication. from Arabic range. Author: Dr Muhammad Baha ud Din; Category: TAWHEED; Language: ARABIC; Format: PDF. Shaykh Baha ud Din Abdullah Bin Aqeel RA was student of Imam.
Nevertheless, non-English words have been italicized. Thus, two dammahs is used instead of dammahtain. The word still remains italicized so as to reflect its non-English origin. It should also be noted that the English equivalents of Arabic grammar terms are mere approximations.
In some cases, they convey the exact meaning. In many cases, they do not. The student is, therefore, urged to focus on the original term in Arabic. To the best of our ability, we have tried to remove all errors. First published: October Tools Request permission Export citation Add to favorites Track citation. Share Give access Share full text access.
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Log in to Wiley Online Library. download Instant Access. View Preview. In doing so, it emphasizes the historical position of the Saudi people as the keepers of the Wahhabi creed.
Competing Models Historically, Saudi Arabia has pinned its legitimacy on the support it gives to Wahhabism, a theologically exclusivist form of Sunni Islam that arose in central Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century. The government has conferred on the Wahhabi religious establishment the privilege of regulating social order, granting the religious scholars a large degree of control over the judicial and educational systems and allowing them to run a religious police force. In return, the rulers earn the approval of a deeply conservative Wahhabi populace.
The Islamic State presents itself not only as the one true Islamic polity on earth but also as the only one faithful to the Wahhabi mission. A review of the relevant history suggests a rather mixed answer. The First Saudi-Wahhabi State The history of Saudi Arabia is widely understood as the history of three successive Saudi-Wahhabi states: the first — , the second — , and the third —present. Unbeknownst to most observers, the Islamic State holds up the first of these as a model to be emulated: an example of an Islamic state that spread tawhid via military conquest, killed the heretics standing in its way, and posited no boundaries to its expansion.
Ustad al’-Ulama Shaykh Ghulam Muhammad Tonswi
The Islamic State is not wrong to see much of itself in the historical first Saudi-Wahhabi state, a radical, expansionary state whose interpretation of Islam was condemned as a fanatical heresy by nearly the entire Muslim world.
And he compels them to do this by the force of the sword, believing that those who oppose him are unbelievers and deeming it licit to take their blood and property even if they demonstrate the pillars of Islam. The two leaders agreed to support each other, the Al Saud supporting the Wahhabi mission and the Wahhabi missionaries supporting Saudi political authority.
Gradually, the Saudi-Wahhabi state came to encompass most of the Arabian Peninsula, including by the holy sites of Mecca and Medina.
Its expansion was predicated on jihad understood as offensive religious war against all manifestations of shirk. In numerous letters, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab explained the basis of his expansionary jihad, arguing that he and his followers were calling people to turn away from idolatry. Everyone we have fought has been made aware of our mission.
Nearly 2, of its men were killed. The Saudi capital was razed and its political and religious leaders were exiled or executed. The fanatical heresy of Wahhabism seemed to meet its end. Growing in fits and starts, the second Saudi-Wahhabi state never attained the power and size of the first, and its political leaders were less ideologically charged.
It collapsed in during a long civil war.
The third and final Saudi-Wahhabi state emerged in when Abdulaziz ibn Saud, a member of the Saudi family living in Kuwait, took Riyadh and conquered the rest of Arabia in about two decades.
In , Abdulaziz renamed his state the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The second Saudi-Wahhabi state never attained the power and size of the first, and its political leaders were less ideologically charged.
At first, the third Saudi-Wahhabi state looked much like the first. The basis of its expansion, as before, was jihad to spread tawhid and eliminate shirk. It took up arms against fellow Sunni Muslims on the grounds that they had apostatized from Islam.
In , they called on him to convert or expel the Shia of the Eastern Province.
As the kingdom ceased waging expansionary jihad and began tolerating the Shia, it resembled less and less the first Saudi-Wahhabi state. They may not have liked it, but the official Wahhabi scholars of the kingdom acknowledged that the king was acting in accordance with his prerogative as ruler in calling off armed jihad. Yet despite this acknowledgment, the Wahhabi scholars of the third Saudi-Wahhabi state held to the radical mold of their forebears for decades to come.
They continued to fashion an intolerant and sectarian version of their faith. Thus the jihadis of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, though viewing King Abdulaziz as having betrayed Islam, often quote the scholars who served him, and even those who came after. For example, Turki al-Binali, the thirty-one-year-old Bahraini presumed to be the mufti of the Islamic State, begins one of his books with a poem by Ibn Sihman.
Yet some jihadi scholars have viewed certain hardline members of the present Saudi religious establishment with favor, even studying with them. Binali, for example, is proud to have studied with the hardliner Abdallah ibn Jibreen.
In a lecture, Binali reminded his audience that one must differentiate among the Saudi states. The third is the last in sequence and the last in worth.
In an essay in early , Binali highlighted the resemblance between the first Saudi-Wahhabi state and the Islamic State. One of these is a lengthy treatise on the requirement of excommunicating fellow Muslims deemed somehow wayward. In mid, a video from Deir Ezzor Province in eastern Syria showed a classroom of supposedly penitent Syrians studying the nullifiers with a Saudi teacher and admitting guilt in the matter of nullifier number eight, since they had supported the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
For example, the most important text at Islamic State training camps is a lengthy explication of Wahhabi creed, apparently written by Binali.
He noted that both states were denounced as Kharijites, an early radical Muslim sect. The Islamic State did not follow the pattern of the first three Saudi-Wahhabi states in allying the religious mission of Wahhabism with the family dynasty of the Al Saud. It is the fourth in this succession of states only in its Wahhabi component, viewing alliance with the current members of the Al Saud as impossible on account of their impiety.
The caliphate, understood in Islamic law as the ideal Islamic polity uniting all Muslim territories, does not figure much in traditional Wahhabi writings. The Wahhabis could have held up their state as a countercaliphate to the Ottoman caliphate, which they declared a state of kufr unbelief until its demise in But they never did.
And in fact it is somewhat ironic that Wahhabism, which began as an anticaliphate movement, should become the instrument of a procaliphate movement. Violence was by no means absent from the first Saudi-Wahhabi state, as has been seen.
They were introduced by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who had been introduced to them by a certain Egyptian scholar in Afghanistan named Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir. The Islamic State is, therefore, by no means the inevitable expression of historical Wahhabism. It does bear greater resemblance to the first Saudi-Wahhabi state in its commitment to fighting jihad against perceived heretics, particularly the Shia, than does the modern Saudi kingdom.
Indeed, the Islamic State has wantonly killed Shia in the same places in Saudi Arabia where its Wahhabi forebears wantonly killed Shia.
But in spurning the traditional alliance with the Al Saud, it has adopted certain ideas about politics, violence, and the apocalypse that the three Saudi-Wahhabi states never did.
Nonetheless, those nostalgic for the more aggressive Wahhabism of old could be forgiven for seeing more of this in the Islamic State than in modern Saudi Arabia. They could fulfill their duty of hijra by building up the Islamic State at home. Seventeen separate security incidents related to the Islamic State were reported between November and November , including one carried out in Kuwait see table 1.
The strategy in place was outlined by Baghdadi in his November announcement see appendix.Maktabat al-Rushd Saudi. But in Saudi Arabia it seemed to yield a measure of success. Shaykh Muhammad Akkoor.
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Dar Usul al-Din Egypt. Shaykh Abdur Razzaaq al-Abbaad.
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